Exporters to countries that value CEO power will have more powerful CEOs by Krause, Ryan et al.
11/2/2016




Silicon Valley from above, by Patrick Nouhailler, under a CC-BY-SA-2.0 licence
Corporate governance scholars have long argued that a board of directors can serve a legitimising role for their
organisation. But strong CEO power, in their view, can be de-legitimating because of its non-compliance with “good
governance” principles.
By legitimacy, in corporate governance terms, we mean that there is a perception that the actions of the
organisation conform to or are appropriate within some socially constructed system of values. Whose perception is
important here? Typically, scholars identify investors, analysts, and regulators as the key audiences.
However, there is a sense that the expectations of customers, especially those outside the firm’s home country, may
be equally important for its corporate governance development. Legitimacy in the eyes of customers becomes even
more important to consider when their standards of legitimacy are not aligned with those enshrined in the firm’s
home country. At present, understanding of the link between governance characteristics and the demand-side
legitimation process is limited.
The dominant corporate governance logic has crowded out consideration of non-stockholder related external
assessors. Yet this group possesses great power to confer legitimacy on a firm, and may potentially view CEO
power very differently to financial market participants. Indeed, they may view a strong and powerful leader as more
legitimate than one dominated by a strong board. Customer participation is indispensable to a firm’s continued
existence, and little research has so far examined the role the customers can play in shaping the firm’s governance.
To explore the potential for customers’ influence on corporate governance decisions, we set out to investigate
whether companies alter their CEOs’ power to match the cultural expectations of their customers. Specifically, we
hypothesised that firms selling their products in foreign markets characterised by high respect for power will exhibit
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greater CEO power on their boards, because a strong CEO carries more legitimacy among the firm’s customers.
To test this hypothesis, we collected data from 151 publicly traded U.S. semiconductor and pharmaceutical firms
over a ten year period. We constructed a weighted-average measure of a firm’s “demand-side cultural power
distance”, essentially the extent to which the firm sells predominantly in countries with high respect for power. The
data confirmed our expectation: firms that compete heavily in high-power distance cultures are more likely to have
powerful CEOs.
We also predicted that this effect would be stronger for firms in greater need of establishing or maintaining cultural
legitimacy. Specifically, we predicted that the link between demand-side cultural power distance and CEO power
would be stronger for firms doing business in a more concentrated group of countries, for firms doing business in a
more homogeneous group of countries, and for semiconductor firms relative to pharmaceutical firms.
The logic for these predictions was as follows. The fewer countries in which a firm does business, the more
important it is to demonstrate legitimacy in those countries. Similarly, the more culturally homogeneous the countries
are in which a firm does business, the more salient cultural attributes — like respect for power — will be in firm
decision-making.
Finally, because pharmaceutical firms tend to be more monopolistic with branded products that are difficult to
imitate, we expected them to be less reliant on legitimacy with their customers than semiconductor firms are. The
data confirmed these three predictions as well.
Thus, we are able here to address CEO power and legitimation of the firm in the eyes of customers. We focus
specifically on customers’ home culture and how that culture will affect legitimacy judgments of the firm. Thus, we
demonstrate how firms seek to match their CEOs’ power with the legitimacy standards that are dominant in the
geographic regions in which they compete for sales, even when high CEO power contradicts the agency-driven
perceptions of the investor community at home.
We hope this study prompts further consideration of demand-side/customer driven legitimacy in theoretical research
of board phenomena. The study challenges traditional views of governance as a main driver of the firm’s strategy by
suggesting that board configurations themselves may be an outcome of strategic decisions of the firm related to its
choice of markets. For example, the most recent corporate governance initiatives focus on increasing board
diversity, including diversity of gender composition. Our study suggests that firms might face some difficulties
implementing this initiative if they conduct business in countries with high masculinity cultures. Further, social
pressures stemming from demand-side legitimacy may not be aligned with the demands of equity markets, as well
as regulatory guidelines.
As the recent scandals involving tax avoidance by the largest blue-chip companies clearly indicate, efficiency-driven
strategies, albeit within the scope of full compliance with legal rules and regulations, may cause a serious backlash
when companies ignore possible consequences associated with social, normative expectations from customers and
other stakeholders. In turn, this failure to recognize legitimacy arguments may be followed by an introduction of
much tougher regulations by the government.
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Notes:
This blog post is based on the authors’ paper When in Rome, Look Like Caesar? Investigating the Link
between Demand-side Cultural Power Distance and CEO Power, in Academy of Management, August 2016,
vol. 59, no. 4 1361-1384
The post gives the views of the author, not the position of LSE Business Review or the London School of
Economics.
2/3
Before commenting, please read our Comment Policy.
Ryan Krause (r.krause@tcu.edu) is an assistant professor of strategy in the Neeley School of
Business at Texas Christian University. He received his Ph.D. in Strategic Management and
Organization Theory from Indiana University. He currently serves on the editorial review boards of
Academy of Management Journal, Strategic Management Journal, and Journal of Management
Studies. His research interests include boards of directors, top management teams, and
stakeholder management.
Igor Filatotchev (igor.filatotchev@city.ac.uk) is Professor of Corporate Governance and Strategy
at Cass Business School, City University London. He is also a Visiting Professor at Vienna
University of Economics and Business (Austria). He received his PhD in Economics from the
Institute of World Economy and International Relations (Moscow). His current research interests
include corporate governance, entrepreneurship and international business strategy.  He is a
General Editor of Journal of Management Studies.
Garry D. Bruton is a professor at Texas Christian University.  He has published or has
forthcoming over 100 academic articles in leading journals such as the Academy of Management
Journal, Strategic Management Journal, Journal of Business Venturing, Journal of International
Business Studies, Journal of Management Studies, and Entrepreneurship Theory & Practice. In
addition, Garry has co-authored three text books –small business management (McGraw-Hill),
technology and innovation management (Cengage), and international management (Cengage). In
2005 Professor Bruton was the first holder of the Hall Chair in Entrepreneurship in Emerging
Markets offered by the Fulbright Foundation.  He is currently associate editor of the Strategic
Entrepreneurship Journal.  Previously he was president of the Asia Academy of Management, and
former editor of the Academy of Management Perspectives.
 
Copyright © 2015 London School of Economics
3/3
